Corporations--Disregard of Corporate Fiction--Licensing of Insurance Agents (State ex rel. Marsh & McLennan Co. v. Safford, State Superintendent of Insurance, 159 N.E. 829 (Ohio 1927)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 2 
Number 2 Volume 2, May 1928, Number 2 Article 14 
June 2014 
Corporations--Disregard of Corporate Fiction--Licensing of 
Insurance Agents (State ex rel. Marsh & McLennan Co. v. Safford, 
State Superintendent of Insurance, 159 N.E. 829 (Ohio 1927)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1928) "Corporations--Disregard of Corporate Fiction--Licensing of Insurance 
Agents (State ex rel. Marsh & McLennan Co. v. Safford, State Superintendent of Insurance, 159 N.E. 829 
(Ohio 1927))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 2 : No. 2 , Article 14. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol2/iss2/14 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
RECEN T DECISIONS
parties and the subject matter in suit shall be given in the courts of
every other State the same credit, validity and effect which it has in the
State where it was rendered, and be equally conclusive upon the merits.'
This is likewise true where a judgment in one State is based upon a
cause of action which arose in the State in which it is sought to be
enforced; and the judgment, if valid where rendered, must be enforced
in such other state though repugnant to its own statutesYr
In Fauntleroy v. Lur 8 the original cause of action arose in Mississippi
out of a gambling contract in cotton futures. Such contracts were by
statute in that State unenforceable. Suit was, however, instituted in
Missouri, the defendant being temporarily there and a judgment for the
plaintiff was recovered. When suit was brought in Mississippi on the
Missouri judgment, the defendant had judgment which was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Mississippi. This decision was reversed in
the United States Supreme Court where the rule which is controlling was
reiterated. "A judgment is conclusive as to all the media concludendi,
and it needs no authority to show that it cannot be impeached in or out
of the State by showing that it was based upon a mistake of law."
In the instant case the Oregon judgment, being valid and conclusive
between the parties in that State, was equally conclusive in the Courts
of Washington and under the full faith and credit clause should have
been enforced by them. The defendant could not avail himself of the
obvious error of the Oregon court in its interpretation of the Washington
statute of limitations.
CORPORATIONs-DISREGARD OF CORPORATE FIcTIoN-LIcENSING OF
INSURANCE AGENTS.-The Supreme Court of Ohio has lately contributed
a most interesting adjunct to that steadily expanding body of law centred
about the disregard of the corporate fiction. An Ohio corporation
organized in 1916 for the purpose of acting as local agent for fire
insurance companies, *sought a license for the conduct of its business for
the fiscal year ending February, 1928 All formal statutory prerequisites
had been met. The State Superintendent of Insurance denied the appli-
cation, on the ground that "no person may be licensed to act as an
insurance agent unless a resident of this state."' It appeared that a
controlling interest in the Ohio corporation was owned by a foreign
corporation extensively engaged in insurance brokerage and. at the
time, the holler of an Ohio foreign insurance broker's license.
The domestic corporation resorted to mandamus, setting forth in its
petition the above facts and the avowed ground of the superintendent's
refusal. Respondent demurred. Held, demurrer sustained. State ex
rel. Marsh & McLennan Co. v. Safford, State Superintendent of Insur-
ance. 159 N. E. 829 (Ohio, Dec. 28, 1927).
4Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234. 4 L. Ed. 378 (1818); Hancock
National Bank v. Furnum, 176 U. S. 640. 20 S. Ct. 506, 44 L. Ed. 619 (1899).
5 Fauntleroy v. Luri, 210 U. S. 231, 28 S. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039 (1907):
Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411. 40 S. Ct. 371, 64 L. Ed. 683 (1910).
6 Supra note S.
IOhio General Code § 644.
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The Court prefaced its discussion with a brief consideration of the
constitutionality of the statute restricting agency licenses to residents of
the state. This was declared sustained by two United States Supreme
Court decisions,2 the latter of which merely mentioned the statute in
passingA8 More deserving of attention, however, is that portion of the
opinion wherein the Court proceeds to the "conclusion that the relator
company is but the alter ego of a nonresident insurance broker corpora-
tion desiring to write insurance in Ohio, but unable to obtai 3 a resident
license, and that the course pursued by it is but an attempt to do by
indirection that which cannot be accomplished by direct and legal
methods." 4
At the outset, the Court seized upon the fact that the foreign
corporation, owner of a controlling interest in the relator, was the
holder of a foreign insurance broker's license which "would be sur-
rendered upon the awarding of a license of the relator as a local agent."
This the Court reasoned made it "plain that the purpose of the securing
of a license by the relator company is to enable Marsh & McLennan,
Incorporated, * * * to circumvent the statute of Ohio which prevents
such license being secured by other than a resident of the State of Ohio."
Having become thus satisfied, there remained but to interpolate a stock
statement of the circumstances under which courts will disregard the
fiction of corporate entity-as the Ohio decisions declare, "when it is
attempted to be used as a means of accomplishing a fraud or an illegal
act." 1 This discussion leads to an apparent non sequitur, "The principle
of denying the right to do by indirection what cannot be done by direct
method is thus clearly recognized. If a non-resident insurance company
cannot write insurance in Ohio without a resident license, how can this
desired result be acquired by coming into the state in the guise of an
owner of a controlling interest in a domestic corporation, thus seeking
2 La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, 39 Sup. Ct. 160 (1919); Pal-
metto Fire Insurance Co. v. Conn., 272 U. S. 295, 47 Sup. Ct. 88 (1926).
2 "These statutes forbid the insuraice of property in the State except by
a legally authorized agent, resident in Ohio, and tax the business lawfully
done there. * ** Exactly how far the laws can go and what proceedings can
or cannot be taken, may be left to be determined, if the questions arise, in the
State Courts." 272 U. S. 295, 303, 306
4159 N. E 829, 831.
5 To support the proposition of the text, the Court cited cases admittedly
representative of the general rule as to the disregard of the corporate entity,
but, it is submitted, failed to bring the instant case within their authority.
In First National Bank of Chicago. v. Trebein Co., 59 Ohio St. 316 (1898),
where a failing debtor formed a closed corporation to which he transferred
all his assets, the decision was "placed on the ground that the conveyance
by T. to the company was fraudulent as to his other creditors, and should
be set aside." State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137 (1892) was con-
cerned with the action of a majority of shareholders in pooling their ntock
in an illegal combination; while in Brundred v. Rice, 49 Ohio St. 640 (1892),
the promoters of a corporation formed to secure illegal discrimination in
freight rates were not permitted to avail themselves of the corporate entity
by way of defense.
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to circumvent the statute relative to resident licenses ?" The final con-
clusion we already have.
The determination in the instant case is indeed a far cry from those
decisions of not many years past, holding a corporation incapable of
acting beyond the state of its creation.6 Here we have a foreign cor-
poration, represented merely by stock ownership, held capable of "a
fraud or an illegal act" in the event that the domestic corporation, in
which it is financially interested, applies for a license procurable by
residents of the state.? From the opinion,8 there appears no ground of
objection to the conduct of the proposed business by the domestic cor-
poration. Assuredly, if facility of control be the desideratum, a domestic
corporation would seem preferable. Apparently, the Court, following
the interpretation of the Insurance department "under facts so similar
as to make the situation almost parallel," has seen fit to superimpose a
further requirement in addition to that of residence, and will insist that
the source of the capital used be domestic. In a word, the rule here
enunciated seems neither practicable in administration nor conducive to
the honest and convenient conduct of business.
DOMESTIc RELATIONS-MARRIAGE-ANNULMENT-FORMER HUSBAND
OR WIFE LIVING.-The petitioner seeks an annulment of his marriage
with the respondent under section 3004 of the Delaware Code, providing
that the court may annul a marriage contracted while either part), has a
husband or wife living. It appeared that the wife had a husband living
when she married the petitioner, but that the petitioner, after he had
learned that she had not been divorced from her former husband, had
continued to live and cohabit with her. The court granted the annul-
ment on grounds of public policy, holding that the equitable maxim of
unclean hands was not applicable in such a case. Seacord v. Seacord,
139 Ati. 80, Advance Sheets of November 24. 1927.
The question at issue in this case was whether or not the act of the
petitioner in cohabiting with the respondent after knowledge of the prior
existing marriage precluded the granting of relief. At the common law
such a marriage was absolutely void.' By the statutes of Delaware such
a marriage was unlawful.2  The rule of par! delicto does not apply in
annulment cases. Because the state is an interested party the equitable
maxim that "He who comes into equity must do so with clean hands"
cannot be resorted to." Rice. J.. in directing the entry of a decree annul-
ing the marriage, referred to what is considered the leading case in New
See I St. John's L. Rev. 48.
The fact that the relator had been incorporated in Ohio prior to the
passage of the resident agents law was regarded as "immaterial."
9 The record upon which the court passed may have included further facts,
but the opinion is apparently based upon the conviction that the relator had
resorted to subterfuge.
12 Schouler on Marriage, Divorce. Separation and Domestic Relations,
6th ed.. 1386.
2 Delaware Rev. Code, 1915. §§ 3004. 3008 and 4785; also § 3016 Rev. Code
1915, as amended by chapter 217, 28 Laws of Delaware.
3 2 Schouler, op. cit., supra, note 1, 1420.
